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expansion of the frontiers would almost inevitably imply the settlement of the Greek question on the basis of the autonomy of the Greek state. However, Kapodistrias was determined to insist on both objectives, disassociating, as far as circumstances allowed, one from the other.
The favourable circumstances created because of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in April 1828 facilitated the governor’s manoeuvres. One of his first objectives was to secure the dispatch of an allied expeditionary force to the Peloponnese, which would undertake to drive out the remnants of Ibrahim’s army. A clear signal would thus be given that the three Powers were determined to persevere in their decision to create a Greek state, albeit an autonomous one as described in the provisions of the Protocol of Saint Petersburg and the Treaty of London. Kapodistrias’ concerted efforts bore fruit, even if in the end only French troops arrived in the Peloponnese.18
Kapodistrias skilfully exploited the deterioration of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the three Powers, which inevitably occurred immediately after the Battle of Navarino. The am- bassadors of the three Powers left Constantinople and moved first to Corfu and from there, in September 1828, to Poros. Thus, Kapodistrias had the advantage of direct contact with them and thus the possibility of exerting more significant influence. He gave priority to ensuring the widest possible boundaries for the Greek state. He included his suggestions in a memorandum, submitted on 11/23 September 1828 to the Ambassadorial Conference. In it, he requested that the Greek land border should be drawn along a line starting on the west from the coast of Epirus, a little northern of Corfu, and ending on the east on the northern outskirts of Mount Olympus. The memorandum also claimed the inclusion in Greek territory of Euboea, Crete, Samos and all the other Aegean islands. On the contrary, Kapodistrias deliberately avoided mentioning the crucial issue of whether the Greek state would be autonomous or independent, as his priority at the time was the issue of borders. On 30 November/12 December 1828, the Poros Conference decided in favour of the Amvrakikos-Pagasitikos boundary line, proposing at the same time the cession of Euboea and the Cyclades to the Greek state and leaving open the possibility of the incorporation of Samos and Crete. Finally, according to the opinion of the three ambassadors, the new state would remain a tributary to the Sultan, while the supreme executive power would be exercised by a hereditary ruler.19
THE RECOGNITION OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE
The importance of the ambassadorial opinion was mitigated by the fact that the governments of the three Powers had already, a few weeks earlier, proceeded to sign a new Protocol in Lon- don (4/16 November 1828). Under this Protocol, the Greek state was to be autonomous and include within its borders only the Peloponnese and the Cyclades. The looming territorial muti- lation would deprive Greece of valuable territories, significant Greek populations and essential wealth-producing resources. The Greek state described by the London Protocol of 1828 would not only be small, but also extremely weak and vulnerable, to the extent that its survival in the long term would be doubtful.
The factor that was to tip the balance was the development of the Russo-Turkish War, which had begun in April 1828. Russian victories on the battlefields prompted the British to change their stance on the Greek Question, fearing that the Russians might unilaterally impose a solution. Thus, on 10/22 March 1829 a new Protocol was signed in London between Great Britain, Russia
18. Foreign Office, British and foreign state papers, 1828-1829, vol. 16, Ridgway, London 1832,
pp. 1083-1086; Foreign Office, British and foreign state papers, 1829-1830, vol. 17, Ridgway, London 1832, pp. 1295-1297; Correspondance du comte J. Capodistrias, président de la Grèce, vol. 2, Cherbuliez, Geneva/Paris 1839, pp. 320-321, 344-349, 354- 358, 372-377, 420-424,
481-485, 522-525; Despina Themeli-Katifori, The French interest for Greece during the Kapodistrias’ era, Epikairotita, Athens 1985, pp. 45-107; Vasilis Kremmydas, “The French army
in the Peloponnese. Contribution to the history of the Kapodistrian era”, Peloponnisiaka, 12, 1976-1977, pp. 75-102; Driault & Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique, vol. 1, pp. 408-419.
19. D. C. Fleming, John Capodistrias and the Conference of London, 1828- 1831, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1970, pp. 48-66; [Foreign Office], Papers relative to the affairs of Greece, 1826-1832, pp. 491-517; Foreign Office, British and foreign state papers, 1829- 1830, vol. 17, σ. 405-431; Edward Hertslet, The map of Europe by Treaty, vol. 2, Butterworths, London 1875, document no. 141; Crawley, The question of Greek independence, pp. 142-151; Areti -Tounta-Fergadi, Ioannis Kapodistrias as a diplomat,
I. Sideris, Athens 2009, pp. 36-37.
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