Page 243 - Beholding Liberty!

by the Great Powers, including Russia. Meanwhile, however, the revolutionary flame had already been transferred from the Danubian Principalities to Moria, Roumeli, the Aegean Islands and other regions of the Greek mainland. Moreover, despite the ambitions of Klemens von Metter- nich, the chancellor of Austria, the Great Powers convening at Laibach did not take a decision for their military intervention in order to suppress the Greek Revolution by force. The declaration alone, by the Great Powers, of their intention to proceed in this direction could very likely have succeeded in making a non-reversible hit on the Revolution, as it would certainly have drastically discouraged the Greek rebels and would have prevented many others from joining the ranks of the revolutionaries. The contribution behind the scene of Ioannis Kapodistrias, Foreign Minister of Russia, was decisive and certainly beneficial to the purposes of the Revolution.2
The reluctance of the Powers to become actively involved in the Greek Revolution, contrary to what had happened in the chronologically parallel case of uprisings in the Italian peninsula, gave the Greeks valuable time to strengthen their position. At the same time, the news item of the slaughter of Christian civilians and the hanging of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople in retaliation for the outbreak of the Revolution provoked the first major diplomatic intervention of Russia, which demanded that Turkey immediately stop persecuting the Christian citizens of the Ottoman Empire. The sultan’s refusal to respond to the Russian ultimatum exacerbated Rus- so-Turkish relations dramatically. Tsar Alexander I ordered the withdrawal of the Russian ambas- sador from Constantinople. This development, even though it did not result in a Russo-Turkish war, nevertheless obliged Constantinople to maintain strong military forces on the borders with Russia, some of whom could be used to repress the Revolution. In this case, the contribution of Kapodistrias to shaping the Russian stance was also decisive. He himself, however, was unable to convince Tsar Alexander I to adopt another, more decisive policy toward the sultan’s empire, and would soon choose to withdraw from the position of Foreign Minister of Russia.3
Kapodistrias resigned just before the convocation of the Conference of Verona (October 1822), that would once again examine the Greek Question in the light of the complexities it had caused in Russo-Turkish relations. The Ottomans refused the invitation to participate in the work of the Conference, arguing that the Greek Revolution was a domestic issue and was therefore not under the jurisdiction of the Great Powers. The voice of the Greeks was not heard at the Conference, since the Greek delegation – after the papal authorities refused permission for them to travel from Ancona – was not even able to reach Verona. The only thing the Greeks were able to do was to send a message to the members of the Conference that was signed by the revolutionaries declaring, among other things, their unshakeable desire not to recognize any decision regarding their fate that had not received their approval. This action enraged many of the Conference members, who were opposed to the prospect of full political emancipation for the revolutionary Greeks.
The rejection of the revolutionaries’ request to express their views in person foreshadowed the way in which the Members of the Conference of Verona intended to express their feelings about the revolution. The almost absolute dominance of Metternich – after Kapodistrias’ withdrawal from the diplomatic arena – left no room for doubt as to the final result. The Conference ended with the decision to condemn the Greek Revolution, as well as the revolutionary movements in the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. At the same time, it set the preliminary terms for the resto- ration of Russo-Turkish diplomatic relations.4
The decisions made by the Conference of Verona appeared to constitute a triumph for the Pow-
2. Grigoris Daphnis, Ioannis
A. Kapodistrias. The Birth of the Greek state, Ikaros, Athens
1976, pp. 390-403; Constantinos Svolopoulos, “Kapodistrias in Laibach. Two contemporary testimonies”, Tetradia “Efthinis”, 5, 1978, pp. 136-147; Constantinos Svolopoulos, Winning Independence. Ten Essays on the Revolution
of 1821, Patakis, Athens 2010,
pp. 111-147.
3. Édouard Driault & Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique
de la Grèce de 1821 á nos jours, vol. 1, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1925, p. 139-151; Chris M. Woodhouse, Capodistria. The founder of Greek independence, New York/New York/Toronto 1973, p. 238-279; John Capodistrias, Letter to the Tsar Nicholas I, Doric, London/Athens 1977,
pp. 106-123; Archives of John Capodistrias, vol. 1, Corfiot Studies Societies, Corfu 1976, p. 66-83; Kostas Daphnis (ed.) Archives
of Ioannis Kapodistrias, vol. 6, Corfiot Studies Society, Corfu 1984, pp. 223-227, 243-244; Daphnis, Ioannis A. Kapodistrias, pp. 407-423.
4. Foreign Office, British and foreign state papers, 1822-1823, vol. 10, Ridgway, London 1850,
pp. 1021-1022; Driault & Lhéritier Histoire diplomatique,
vol. 1, pp. 187-193; Theodoros Christodoulides, Diplomatic history of three centuries, vol. 2, I. Sideris, Athens 31997, pp. 48-52, 59.
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