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5. C. W. Crawley, The question
of Greek independence. A study of British policy in the Near East, 1821, 1833, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, pp. 17-24.
6. Andr. Mich. Andreadis, History
of national loans. Part I.
The independence Loans, 1824-1825. The public debt during the Bavarian dynasty, Hestia, Athens 1904, pp. 1-72; G. Bartle, “Bowring and the Greek loans of 1824 and 1825”, Balkan Studies, 3, 1962, pp. 61-74; Maria-Christina Chatziioanou, “War, crisis and sovereign loans. The Greek War
of Independence and British Economic expansion in the 1820s”, The Historical Review/La Revue Historique, 10, 2013, pp. 33-35.
7. Driault & Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique, vol. 1, pp. 222-232; Christodoulides, Diplomatic history, vol. 2, pp 69-70; Thanos Remis & Giannis Koliopoulos, Greece.
The modern sequel. From 1821 to the present, Kastaniotis, Athens 32006, p. 206; Chris
M. Woodhouse, 1821. The Greek War of Independence, Hestia, Athens 1978, p. 148.
ers that did not want the Greek Revolution to succeed. Early in 1823, the Greek Question seemed to be sunk in the vortex of the Great Powers’ interests. The situation became even worse owing to the unwillingness of Russia to play an active role in resolving the Greek Question. At this crit- ical moment, however, an unexpected development emerged that would change the situation in favour of Greek interests: the change of British foreign policy towards the Greek Question.
BRITAIN AND RUSSIA
The first signs of London’s change of course became obvious in the autumn of 1822 when, after the suicide of Robert Castlereagh, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, his place was taken by George Canning. In contrast to Castlereagh who had been interested in retaining the status quo in the Near East and, as a consequence, had reservations regarding the prospect of creating a Greek state, Canning foresaw that the Greek Revolution, in conjunction with the weak-spirited and contradictory policy of Russia, created a significant opportunity for Great Britain to broaden its influence in the Mediterranean and thus to play a primary role in any future management of the Eastern Question.
It was in this context that in March 1823 the British announced that they would respect the blockade of Ottoman shores in the Ionian Sea, which had been announced a year earlier by the Greek revolutionary government. This was a move that entailed the recognition of the revolution- aries as belligerents.5 In February 1824, the Greeks were granted a loan by British banks for the amount of 800.000 British pounds. A year later, a new loan of 2,000,000 pounds was contracted. Irrespective of the unfavourable6 terms for the Greek side, the loans were an important success at the political level, as they comprised in essence a direct recognition of the existence of a Greek state. At the same time, they created a strong interest among the lenders in London regarding the success of the Revolution, since only in this way could they be certain of being repaid.
The shift in Britain’s foreign policy toward the Greek Revolution provoked the strong concern of Russia. St. Petersburg was worried about the possibility of the undermining of its influence in the geopolitically sensitive area of the Eastern Mediterranean. Traditionally, the British sought to prevent the appearance of Russia in the waters of the Mediterranean. On their side, the Russians sought firmly to acquire a foothold in the Mediterranean, which would permit them to fulfill stra- tegic goals they had set since the late 17th century under the rule of Tsar Peter I.
Under these circumstances, Tsar Alexander I took the initiative of diplomatic moves. On 28 De- cember 1823/9 January 1824, he submitted the first full proposal for the resolution of the Greek Question. Following the administrative model of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Plan provided for the foundation of three autonomous Greek principalities. Of these, the first would include Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica, the second Epirus and Aetolia-Acarnania, and the third the Peloponnese and Crete. At the same time, a special status of administrative autonomy would be recognized on the islands of the Aegean Sea. Based on this Plan, the sultan would col- lect an annual tribute and would retain the nominal rule over the three principalities, which would be underlined at the symbolic level by the presence of Ottoman military guards in some areas. The Greeks would have the exclusive privilege of administering the principalities, each of which would have its own flag and would be represented jointly at the Sublime Porte by the Ecumenical Patriarch.7
The Plan was doomed to failure. The Ottomans refuse to accept it and the Great Powers faced
244 BEHOLDING LIBERTY!