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11. Crawley, The question of Greek Independence, pp. 43-54.
12. Foreign Office, British and foreign state papers, 1826-1827,
vol. 14, Harrison, London 1828,
pp. 629-632; Nikolaos Skoufos, Collection of Treaties, Protocols
and diplomatic documents, constituting the most substantial part of the diplomatic history of
the modern Greek state, vol. 1, Kontaxis and Loulakis, Nafplion 1834, pp. 64-67; Edward Hertslet, The map of Europe by Treaty, vol.
1, Butterworth, London 1875, document no. 129; Thanasis Christou, The borders of the Greek state and the international Treaties, 1830-1947, vol. 1, Dimiourgia, Athens 1999, pp. 102-103; Driault & Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique, vol. 1, pp. 303-321; Douglas Dakin, The Greek struggle for independence, 1821-1833, National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation,
Athens 1983, pp. 219-229. 246 BEHOLDING LIBERTY!
FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE SAINT PETERSBURG TO THE NAVAL BATTLE OF NAVARINO
The refusal of London to undertake the protection of the Greeks did not mean that the British government had lost all interest in the Greek matter. On the contrary, British diplomacy, under the leadership of Canning, made a systematic effort for finding a solution of the Greek Question, preferably in partnership with Russia.11 At the same time, the hardening of the stance of the Ot- toman government, which had been encouraged by the successes of Ibrahim, increased the pos- sibility of a Russo-Turkish war which would have unforeseeable consequences for the sensitive balances in the Near West. This possibility created a further motive in London in order to seek an understanding with Saint Petersburg so as to avoid unilateral Russian initiatives. Developments were further facilitated as a result of the sudden death of Tsar Alexander I on 19 November/1 December 1825. His much more active younger brother Nicholas ascended to the Russian throne.
The change that marked the ascent of Nicholas I to the Russian throne was immediately felt. The new Tsar appeared to have decided to advance beyond the stage of threats, seeking a dynamic solution of the differences that separated Russia from the Ottoman Empire. On 5/17 March 1826, the Russian government sent an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte, demanding the conformity of the Sultan to a number of its demands. These demands did not include the Greek Question. However, it was clear that Nicholas I was determined to adopt a policy of strength to- wards the Ottoman Empire. The British were apprehensive because of this prospect. They feared that Russia might try to take advantage of the situation in order to put in action its long-stand- ing plan of dissolving the Ottoman Empire, thus threatening vital British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to avoid this, the British government hastened to find ways to put a stop to Russian ambitions.
Anglo-Russian consultations, which began immediately, were not long in arriving at a tangible result. On 23 March/4 April 1826, Britain and Russia signed the Protocol of Saint Petersburg, by which the two contracting parties agreed to the general framework of resolving the Greek Ques- tion. The cornerstone of this agreement was the provision regarding the common intervention of the two governments with the goal of ending the armed confrontation between the Greeks and the Ottomans. To this end, they proposed the establishment of an autonomous Greek state, which would remain a tributary of the sultan. The Protocol also anticipated the possibility of the future collaboration of the other Great Powers, so as to ensure the broadest possible interna- tional consent.12
The conclusion of the Protocol of Saint Petersburg was a development of decisive significance in the course of resolving the Greek Question. It constituted the first international action that ex- plicitly foresaw the establishment of a Greek state, even if it would not enjoy full independence. For the first time, the term “Hellas” was used as the name of this state. The Protocol was signed at a time when the Revolution appeared to be breathing its last breath owing to the successive military victories of Ibrahim Pasha. Given these facts, the refusal of Austria and Prussia to ad- here to the Protocol were not sufficient to revoke its long-term effects, especially after France appeared to be willing to collaborate with Great Britain and Russia.
The tripartite understanding between Great Britain, Russia and France was finally reached on 24 June/6 July 1827 through the signing of the Treaty of London. In reality, the Treaty did nothing more than repeat the terms of the Protocol of Saint Petersburg, with the inclusion of France as